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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
JANE SHEPARD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure because the sentencing of Ms. Shepard, on April 23, 1997 is considered the 
final decision of the District Court. See also Utah Code §78-2a-3 (2)(f). 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on May 16, 1997, within 30 days of the entry of 
judgement. Thus, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this appeal is 
timely. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Ms. Shepard appeals from her conviction following the entry of her conditional pleas of 
guilty to the Information charging her with Possession of a Controlled Substance (Psilocybin) in 
violation of Utah Code §58-37-8; Possession of a Controlled Substance (Marijuana) in violation 
of Utah Code §58-37-8; and Possession of Paraphernalia in violation of Utah Code §58-37a-5. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Appellate No. 970317-CA 
* 
Specifically, Ms. Shepard challenges the Trial court's denial of her Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
1. On August 1, 1996, Ms. Shepard was charged in an Information with 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 3rd degree Felony, in violation of a Utah Code §58-37-8; 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class "B" misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
§58-37-8; and Possession of Paraphernalia, a class "B" misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
§58-37a-5. 
2. On March 12, 1997, a Preliminary Hearing was held and Ms. Shepard was bound over 
for trial on all counts of the Information. 
3. On March 6, 1997, Ms. Shepard filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence. A copy of that 
Motion is contained in Addendum B. 
4. On April 17, 1996, an Evidentiary Hearing was held on Ms. Shepard's Motion to 
Suppress Evidence. On the same day, the Motion to Suppress Evidence was denied. 
5. On April 17, 1996, Ms. Shepard entered conditional pleas of guilty to all counts of the 
Information. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
The sentencing was held on April 17, 1996. At that time, the trial court imposed the 
following sentence: Imprisonment at the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five years and 
a fine in the amount of one thousand four hundred eighty dollars ($1480.00). The sentence was 
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stayed upon the condition that Ms. Shepard paid the fine. Ms. Shepard was placed on informal 
probation for twelve (12) months. 
The Notice of Appeal was timely filed on May 16, 1996. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether Trooper Randall exceeded the scope of the stop of Ms. Shepard; 
2. Whether Trooper Randall had probable cause to go through the passenger side of the 
vehicle to look for the VIN number; and 
3. Whether Trooper Randall had probable cause to seize an item from inside the vehicle, 
namely, a corncob pipe. 
Legal determinations regarding reasonable suspicion are mixed questions of law and fact. 
The issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's suppression 
motion. The factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Troyer, 
910 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah 1995). The legal determinations regarding reasonable suspicion made 
by the trial court are reviewed "for correctness according no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions." State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 1996); State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655 
(UtahCt. App. 1996). 
Legal determinations regarding probable cause are reviewed "nondeferentially for 
correctness, affording a measure of discretion to the trial court." State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d at 
3 
657 (quoting State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 30, 1996, Utah Highway Patrol trooper, Sanford Randall, observed a vehicle 
traveling 71 MPH in a 55-MPH zone (T. 6). After stopping the vehicle, Trooper Randall 
approached the driver, Walton Shepard (T. 6). Jane Shepard was a passenger (T. 6). Trooper 
Randall requested the vehicle registration and Mr. Shepard's drivers' license (T. 6) . Mr. Shepard 
handed the trooper his driver's license and explained that the vehicle was owned by their father 
(T. 13). 
At one point, Trooper Randall was given a temporary registration (T. 23, 24, 31). 
Trooper Randall did not recognize the registration and he asked Mr. Shepard to exit the vehicle 
(T. 7). Trooper Randall testified that since there was a handwritten entry on the registration, he 
felt that it could have been altered or written down incorrectly (T. 29). Trooper Randall, 
however, failed to identify any alterations (T. 29). 
Trooper Randall returned to his patrol car and requested that the license plate number be 
run by dispatch (T. 24, 25). At the hearing, the Trooper was unable to recall if he had requested 
this information from the San Juan County Sheriff Dispatch or Price Dispatch (T. 24, 25). 
Trooper Randall testified that he was advised by dispatch that the license plate was not on file 
(T. 13, 14). 
Suspecting the vehicle to be stolen, Trooper Randall approached Jane Shepard and asked 
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her to exit the vehicle while he looked at the vehicle's VIN number (T. 7, 20). Although Trooper 
Randall testified that the VIN number was not located on the passenger side of a vehicle, this was 
inconsistent with his Preliminary Hearing testimony where he indicated that some vehicles had the 
VIN number on the passenger side (T. 16, 17). Trooper Randall testified that he satisfied himself 
that the vehicle was not stolen, but he was unable to recall what information he got back from 
dispatch that convinced him, only that he was convinced that the vehicle was not stolen (T. 24, 
25). 
Trooper Randall further testified that he approached the passenger side at that point, for 
officer safety and to be polite to Ms. Shepard, who had an injured toe (T. 17, 18). He did not 
testify that either occupant acted in a manner that caused him to fear for his safety. 
As Ms. Shepard exited the vehicle, Trooper Randall looked down into the door pocket 
and saw a corncob pipe (T. 21). He testified that he did not smell the odor of marijuana in the 
vehicle (T. 15) Believing the corncob pipe to be a marijuana pipe, he immediately seized it (T. 7). 
When he smelled the pipe, there was the odor of marijuana (T. 15, 16). 
Trooper Randall then questioned both occupants and searched the vehicle (T. 7, 8). The 
resulting search revealed controlled substances namely, mushrooms and marijuana (T. 8). 
Ms. Shepard testified that she showed the trooper the temporary registration (T. 31). 
Ms. Shepard's father also testified that the temporary registration was the one that had been 
issued by the West Virginia authorities; that it indicated that it was temporary; that the 
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registration had a hand-stamped seal of the State; and that the stop occurred prior to the 
expiration date on the registration (T. 35-37). He testified that he had not received the permanent 
registration prior to the children's departure from West Virginia (T. 35). Finally, Mr. Shepard 
testified that he never received a call inquiring whether his vehicle was stolen (T. 36). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court incorrectly concluded that the trooper reasonably extended the lawful 
scope of the stop. The facts did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity 
was afoot. If the seizure had been strictly tied to the purposes of the detention, the trooper would 
have cited the driver for speeding, then sent them on their way. 
The trooper lacked sufficient facts to establish probable cause to go through the passenger 
side to check the VIN number and/or to seize the corncob pipe from the interior of the vehicle. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TROOPER UNLAWFULLY 
EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE STOP 
A police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a motorist if (1) his action was 
reasonably justified at its inception and (2) "the resulting detention was reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place." State v. Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1127, 1131-32 {quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S .Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 
889(1968)). 
An officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a motorist for a traffic violation 
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commited in his presence. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 {quoting State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). Shepard concedes that the inital stop for speeding was justified. 
Even if the initial stop is vaild, this Court must next consider the detention and determine 
whether it "was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in 
the first place." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32. See also, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 
S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)(Once a traffic stop is made, the detention "must be temporary 
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."); State v. Johnson, 
805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991)(discussing scope). Investigative questioning that further detains 
the occupants must be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
The detention in this case violated that Fourth Amendment since the scope of the 
interference was not strictly tied to the purpose of the stop. In the case at hand, the trooper's 
suspicion that the vehicle was stolen was not reasonable. It was based solely on the trooper's 
subjective suspicions about registrations containing any handwritten entries. Here, he could not 
say that the handwritten entry was inaccurate and more important, that the registration had been 
altered. The trooper ran the license number and dispatch had no information that the vehicle was 
stolen. 
The trooper's suspicions would have been reasonable had there been objective evidence 
that suggested the vehicle was stolen such as a broken window or broken steering wheel column 
which would indicate that the vehicle had been "hot wired". 
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The explanation given, that the vehicle belonged to their father who had just purchased it, 
was consistent with the information on the temporary registration. It indicated the date of the 
purchase and was within the 60 day time period for the registration to be valid. 
In United States v. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1985), the defendant was stopped 
for speeding. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer noted the strong smell of a deodorizer. 
The driver had a valid driver's license and registration, but he could not name the owner of the 
vehicle. Suspecting the vehicle was stolen, the officer had the driver follow him to the police 
station where he later consented to the search of the vehicle. 
In holding this to be an unreasonable search and seizure, the Tenth Circuit stated that once 
the officer obtained negative answers about his suspicions, he should have either arrested the 
motorist or allowed him to proceed on his way. Gonzalez, 763 P.2d at 1129. The fact that the 
officer "was unable to articulate particular facts—other than the dedorizer smell and the unusual 
combination of automobile license, registration, and title documents-" detracts from reasonable 
suspicion to detain and search defendant's vehicle. Id, at 1128, 129-31 
Here, the facts are not as compelling as Gonzalez. Perhaps most important is that Trooper 
Randall wholly abandoned his investigation of a possible stolen vehicle after he began searching 
the vehicle. He never checked the VIN number, matching it up to the registration to make sure 
that it had not been written inaccurately or that the numbers matched. He also testified that he 
was "convinced" that the vehicle was not stolen, based on information, though he could not say 
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what information, that he had received from dispatch. This would certainly seem to cast serious 
doubts upon the good faith of the trooper's claimed suspicions that he believed that the vehicle 
may have been stolen. 
The seizure of Ms. Shepard was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah 
State Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. All evidence 
seized as the fruit of the unlawful continued detention must be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). 
POINT II. THE TROOPER LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
SEARCH THE INTERIOR OF THE VEHICLE FOR A VIN NUMBER 
It is well established that when an officer opens a vehicle door for investigatory purposes, 
the action must pass constitutional muster. See State v. Larocco. 19A P.2d 460, 464 (Utah 
1990)("[A]n officer's opening a car door to examine a VIN on doorjamb constitutes a search 
under the fourth amendment.") Here, the trooper ordered the passenger out of the vehicle so that 
he could ostensibly search for the VIN number after entering through the passenger side. For the 
reasons stated in Point I of this brief, the trooper's reasons for going to the passenger side of the 
car are suspect. At the Preliminary Hearing, the trooper testified that VIN numbers are located 
on different parts of a vehicle. He could not, however, identify any vehicle which would have a 
VIN number located on the passenger side. At the Suppression Hearing, he claimed that his prior 
testimony was a misunderstanding and then stated that he went through the passenger side of the 
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vehicle out of concern for his own safety and then, politeness. Certainly, this testimony should be 
viewed with skepticism. 
Finally, the trooper could have quickly confirmed or dispelled his suspicions about the 
validity of the registration and VIN number, by looking through the windshield at the VIN 
number located on the dashboard. See generally Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 
1319, 75 L.Ed. 229(1983). 
The search of the vehicle was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. All evidence seized as 
the fruit of the unlawful search must be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 
1991). 
POINT III. THE TROOPER'S SEIZURE OF THE CORNCOB PIPE 
WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE 
Given the case law that to search a vehicle, an officer must have probable cause, it 
therefore follows that an officer must have probable cause to seize an item from a vehicle's 
interior. See generally, Larocco, 794 P.2d at 463. In other words, an officer does not have the 
authority to closely examine any item that he sees during a traffic stop; An officer must have 
probable cause to believe that the item is contraband. In the case at hand, the trooper saw a 
corncob pipe which, in and of itself, was not incriminating. 
Here, the trooper lacked the probable cause to associate a corncob pipe with criminal 
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activity. The mere viewing of such a pipe is not sufficient absent other incriminating facts. First, 
a corncob pipe is not an item associated with marijuana so as to rise to the level of reasonable 
suspicion, let alone probable cause. Had the pipe contained a black residue, or if the odor of 
marijuana was present, then it is conceded that the trooper would have had, at least, reasonable 
suspicion. The trooper, however, had nothing more than a hunch that the pipe was used for 
inhaling marijuana. Indeed, he did not testify that this was an item that he, either through training 
or experience, associated with marijuana use. 
Moreover, a corncob pipe is not the type of item that one reasonably associates with illicit 
drug use. It is not the same as a "bong", "water pipe" or even a "roach clip". It has dozens of 
innocent uses, from a souvenir to smoking tobacco. Accordingly, the trooper's seizure of the 
pipe was unjustified. 
The seizure of the pipe was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. All evidence seized as 
the fruit of the unlawful search and seizure must be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
786 (Utah 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's ruling denying the Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
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Dated thiscffik day of August, 1997. 
lly submitted: 
LIEEEILLY 
ttorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid to the Office of the San Juan County Attorney, P.O. Box 
850, Monticello, Utah, this 27th day of August, 1997, and to the Office of the Attorney General, 
Appellate Division, 160 East 300 South, Heber Wells Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
27th day of August, 1997. 
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ADDENDUM A 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
I. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV 
II. UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. 
Utah Const. Article 1, Section 14 
DETERMINATIVE UTAH STATUTES 
A. Utah Code § 58-37-8: 
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful 
(I) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance, unless it was obtained from a valid prescription or order, directly from a 
practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise 
authorized by this subsection. 
B. Utah Code § 58-37a-5: 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, 
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, 
conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the 
human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
ADDENDUM B 
Rosalie Reilly #6637 
148 South Main #1 
Post Office Box 404 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
(801)587-3266 
Attorney for Defendant 
JANE SHEPARD 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
297 South Main, Monticello 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, * MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
vs. * MOTION. 
* 
JANE SHEPARD, * Case No.: 9617-169 
Defendant. * Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
MOTION 
Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Defendant, by and 
through her undersigned attorney, hereby moves this Court for an Order to suppress all 
evidence and statements obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, to wit 
1. The observations of any law enforcement officer, including but not limited to, 
the observations made during the search of the vehicle and/or of her person 
2 Any statements attributed to Defendant, and 
3 All tangible and intangible evidence seized as the result of the search 
See State v Larocco, 794 P 2d 460 (Utah 1990) 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Jane Shepard is charged in a three-count information with Possession of a 
Controlled Substance (Psilocybin), in violation of Utah Code §58-37-8 (2)(a)(l), 
Possession of Controlled Substance (Marijuana) in violation of Utah Code §58-37-8 
(2)(a)(l), and Possession of Paraphernalia, in violation of Utah Code §58-37a-5 A 
hearing on this motion is presently scheduled for the hour of 1 30 p m on the 17th day 
of April 1997 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following statement of facts is based on discovery provided by the State to 
date and Sanford Randall's testimony at the preliminary hearing 
On July 30, 1996 Utah Highway Patrol trooper, Sanford Randall observed a 
vehicle driving at a high rate of speed According to the trooper, the vehicle was 
traveling 71 MPH in a 55 MPH zone A traffic stop was initiated 
After stopping the vehicle Trooper Randall approached the driver Walton 
Shepard Jane Shepard was a passenger Trooper Randall requested the vehicle 
registration and Mr Shepard's driver's license Mr Shepard handed the trooper his 
driver's license and explained that the vehicle was registered to their father Mr. 
Shepard explained that he and his sister were traveling together and that they had 
permission to use their father's car. 
Trooper Randall returned to his patrol car and requested that the license plate 
number be run by the San Juan County Sheriff Dispatch Dispatch advised Trooper 
Randall that the plate was not on file. 
Trooper Randall returned to the vehicle and Mr Shepard handed him a piece of 
paper Trooper Randall told Mr Shepard that the paper did not help him and asked 
him to exit the vehicle Trooper Randall then approached Jane Shepard and asked her 
to exit the vehicle while he looked at the vehicle's VIN number As Ms Shepard exited 
the vehicle, Trooper Randall looked into the door pocket and saw a corn-cob pipe 
Believing that to be evidence of a crime, he immediately seized the pipe Trooper 
Randall then questioned both occupants and searched the vehicle The resulting 
search revealed controlled substances namely, mushrooms and marijuana The 
vehicle was impounded and later released to Ms Shepard. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. IHE BURDEN IS ON THE STATE TO JUSTIFY THE STOP OF MS. SHEPARD. 
Wheji an officer by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some 
way restrained the liberty of a person, a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred 
Terry v Ohio 312 U S 1, 19 n 16 (1968) As with any warrantless seizure, the burden 
of justifying the seizure rests with the State See generally 4 W LaFave, Search and 
Seizure 218 (2d Ed 1987) 
The State is prohibited from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures 
during a routine traffic stop Delaware v Prouse. 440 U S 648, 653 (1979), State v 
Lopez, 873 p 2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) Therefore, the stop of the vehicle is 
constitutionally permissible only if the officer's action was reasonably justified at its 
inception and "the resulting detention was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first place " Lopez 873 P 2d at 
1131 -32 (quoting Terry. 392 U S at 19-20) 
Ms Shepard concedes the initial stop was justified The resulting detention, 
however, was illegal because it was not reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the initial stop 
B. THE BURDEN IS ON THE STATE TO JUSTIFY THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE-
A warrantless search of an automobile is per sa unreasonable unless the 
officers have probable cause to believe that the automobile contained contraband See 
State v Larocco, 794 P 2d 460 Utah State Constitution, Article 1 Section 14 The 
burden of establishing that the warrantless search was lawful is on th° State 
Larrocco at 470, citing State v Chnstensen. 676 P 2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984) 
Probable cause exists when there are "facts and circumstances within the 
officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable 
caution in believing, in the circumstances shown, the suspect had committed, is 
committing, or is about to commit an offense. Michigan v. Flillipo. 443 U.S. 31, 37 
(1979). 
At the time the search was initiated, there was no indication that the vehicle 
contained contraband The search, therefore, was in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment as well as Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
C. IFJHE STATE CANNOT MEET ITS BURDEN. THE EVIDENCE FOUND 
DURING THE SEARCH MUST BE SUPPRESSED AS "FRUITS' . 
The Fourth Amendment requires not only the exclusion of all evidence directly 
obtained through its violation but also the exclusion of all "fruits" thereof. See Wong 
. Sun v. United„States, 371 U S. 471, 488 (1963). Whether indirectly obtained evidence 
is a "fruit" turns on whether it "has been come at by exploitation of [the primary] 
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint." i d at 488, quoting Maquire, Evidence of Guilt. 221 (1951). Once a defendant 
has established a factual nexus between the illegality and evidence in question, the 
burden is on the state to show the that the taint has been sufficiently diluted. 
The present case shows a clear nexus. Without the initial stop there would not 
have been a search of the vehicle. Any statements made by Ms Shepard or any 
evidence thereafter secured must be suppressed as "fruits". 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The State must justify the stop of the defendant. It must also justify the 
warrantless search of the vehicle. The exclusionary rule prevents the introduction of 
evidence obtained as the direct or indirect product of an unconstitutional search If the 
State cannot justify the stop and search, any evidence found as a result thereof must 
be suppressed 
DATED this 5th day of March, 1997 
Respectfully submitted: 
/ / / 
ROSALIE REILLY 
Attorney for Defendant 
/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 6th day of March, 1997, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Suppress was hand-delivered to Craig Halls at 
the Public Safety Building at 297 South Matrrin Monticello, Utah. 
(ML 
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